ABSTRACT. In finite games, the graph of the Nash equilibrium correspondence is a semialgebraic set (i.e. it is defined by finitely many polynomial inequalities). This fact implies several game theoretical results about the structure of equilibria. We show that many of these results can be readily exported to Poisson games even if the expected utility functions are not polynomials. We do this proving that, in Poisson games, the graph of the Nash equilibrium correspondence is a globaly subanalytic set. Many of the properties of semialgebraic sets follow from a set of axioms that the collection of globaly subanalytic sets also satisfy. Hence, we easily show that every Poisson game has finitely many connected components and that at least one of them contains a stable set of equilibria. By the same reasoning, we also show how generic determinacy results in finite games can be extended to Poisson games.
INTRODUCTION
The geometric structure of Nash equilibria has been exploited to obtain several game-theoretical results. In particular, the graph of the Nash equilibrium correspondence of a finite game is a semialgebraic set, i.e., a set defined by a finite system of polynomial inequalities. Every semialgebraic set is homeomorphic to a finite simplicial complex (van der Waerden, 1939) , hence, the set of Nash equilibria of a game consists of finitely many connected components and at least one of them contains a stable set (Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986) . Blume and Zame (1994) exploit another fundamental result of semialgebraic geometry, van den Dries (1986) , the collection of globaly subanalytic sets.
2 Every bounded semianalytic set is globaly subanalytic, therefore, we can easily show that the set of Nash equilibria of any Poisson game as well as the graph of the Nash equilibrium correspondence for Poisson games are globaly subanalytic sets. We use the general version of the Generic Local Triviality Theorem for o-minimal structures to show the generic finiteness of Nash equilibria in some general Poisson games as well as some relevant Poisson voting models.
In the next section, we review the general description of Poisson games. We discuss the geometric structure of the Nash equilibrium set in Section 3 and prove that stable sets in Poisson games satisfy the same version of connectedness as Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) stable sets for finite games. We give a quick review of o-minimal structures in Section 4 and use some of its basic properties in Section 5 to establish the generic finiteness of Nash equilibria in some Poisson games including plurality, negative plurality, and approval voting games.
POISSON GAMES
We adopt the same notation used in De Sinopoli, Meroni, and Pimienta (2014) , where the description of Poisson games closely follows the one introduced by Myerson (1998) .
A Poisson game is a tuple Γ := (n, T , r, (C t ) t∈T , Ω, θ, v). The number of players is a Poisson random variable with parameter n. Given n, the probability that there are k players in the game is
The set T = {1, . . . , T} is the non-empty finite set of possible types of players.
A player is of type t ∈ T with probability r t . The probabilities that a player is of each type are listed in the vector r = (r 1 , . . . , r T ) ∈ ∆(T ). 3 We let C t be the finite set of actions that are available to players of type t.
The set of all actions is C := t C t . An action profile x ∈ Z(C) specifies for each action c ∈ C the number of players x(c) who choose that action. The set of action profiles is Z(C) := Z C + . A player of type t ∈ T who chooses action c ∈ C t when the action profile is x ∈ Z(C) induces some outcome that belongs to the outcome set Ω. This information is specified by the outcome function θ : T × C × Z(C) → ∆(Ω). Note that, e.g., the outcome function can be the identity function as in Myerson (1998) .
The utility vector v = (v 1 , . . . , v T ) summarizes players' preferences over outcomes. Each entry v t is a bounded function v t : Ω → R. The utility function that a player of type t has over elements in C × Z(C) is computed according to
The set ∆(C t ) is the set of mixed actions for type t players. We identify the mixed action that assigns probability one to action c with the pure action c ∈ C.
A strategy function σ = (σ 1 , . . . , σ T ) is a function from T to ∆(C) that satisfies σ t ∈ ∆(C t ) for all t ∈ T , i.e. a mapping from the set of types to the set of mixed actions available to each corresponding type. We let Σ denote the set of all strategy function. We may sometimes refer to strategy functions simply as strategies.
Letτ(σ) ∈ ∆(C) be the population's "average" behavior induced by the strategy σ, which is given byτ(σ)(c) := t∈T r(t)σ t (c). Moreover, we define the setτ(Σ) := {τ ∈ ∆(C) : τ =τ(σ) for some σ ∈ Σ}. When the population's average behavior is given by τ ∈τ(Σ), the probability that the action profile x ∈ Z(C) is realized is equal to
The expected payoff to a player of type t who plays action c ∈ C t is then
From now on we fix n, T , r, (C t ) t∈T , Ω, and θ. A Poisson game is then given by a utility vector v ∈ R #ΩT . We denote such a game Γ(v).
THE SET OF NASH EQUILIBRIA
Let s := t #C t . It is convenient to give the following definition of Nash equilibrium.
Definition 1. The vector ς ∈ R s is a Nash equilibrium of Γ(v) if and only if it is a solution to the following system of equalities and inequalities:
Conditions (3.1) and (3.2) ensure that ς belongs to the set of strategy functions Σ. Conditions (3.3) ensure that, when every player is playing according to the strategy function ς, if ς t (c t ) > 0 then action c t is a best response for a player of type t against ς.
In finite normal form games, expected utilities are polynomial functions. The Nash equilibrium conditions define a semialgebraic set which, in turn, is homeomorphic to a finite simplicial complex (van der Waerden, 1939) . This fact was used by Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) to show that, for any game, the set of Nash equilibria consists of finitely many connected components. In a Poisson game, the Nash equilibrium conditions (3.3) are clearly not polynomial inequalities. However, Lemma 1 below shows that the expected utility functions are real analytic (i.e., functions that are locally given by a convergent power series) and, therefore, the Nash equilibrium conditions define a semianalytic set.
neighborhood O such that O ∩ X is a finite union of sets of the form
where f , g 1 , . . . , g k are real analytic functions on O.
By definition, the class of semianalytic sets includes also sets defined by weak inequalities. This class is closed under finite union, finite intersection, finite product, and complementation. It is also the case that every compact semianalytic set is homeomorphic to a finite simplicial complex (Lojasiewicz, 1964 
We actually prove that U t (c, ·; v t ) is a complex analytic function, i.e., a complex function that is locally given by a convergent power series. The sum, product and composition of complex analytic functions are complex analytic, and the limit of a sequence of complex analytic functions that converges uniformly on every compact subset of the domain is also complex analytic. 4 Examples of complex analytic functions are polynomials and the exponential function, hence, once we fix n ∈ N + then, for any y ∈ N + , the function
−1 is complex analytic because it is the product of compositions of complex analytic functions. 4 The latter result follows from the Weierstrass approximation theorem. This is in contrast with the situation in real analysis, where the limit of a sequence of real analytic functions that converges uniformly on a compact subset of the domain is not necessarily real analytic in that subset.
Take some
is also complex analytic because it is a composition of complex analytic functions.
Define the set of profiles 
The function U b t (c, ·; v t ) is complex analytic because it is the finite sum of complex analytic functions. The sequence of complex analytic functions
In our case this holds if for each ε > 0 we can find an N ∈ N ++ such that
Since the utility function is bounded, u * t := sup x∈Z(C) |u t (c, x; v t )| < ∞. Consider an arbitrary compact subset Q ⊂ C K and let α := max τ∈Q |τ|. For every integer h and every τ ∈ Q, the value to the left of the previous inequality is smaller than or equal to
If ξ := ⌊nα⌋ we have
Noting that there are (
We now put the sum over elements in Z b+h+1 \ Z b+h in terms of this bound. Let us start with an arbitrary profile
such that x ′ = x + (e 1 , . . . , e K ) where e i ∈ {0, 1} for every i and e i = 1 only if
in such a way. Let b be large enough so that nα < b + 1. Letting H replace the obvious expression in (3.5) that does not depend on b we have
Iterating the same recursive argument, the last expression in (3.4) is less than
As b grows we eventually have (2 K −1)nα < (b+1), thus, (3.6) converges to zero as b goes to infinity. This implies that the sequence of complex analytic functions
Since the image of any real vector
real analytic when restricted to the real domain.
Given our previous discussion, an immediate consequence of this result is the analogue of Proposition 1 in Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) .
Theorem 1. The set of Nash equilibria of a Poisson game Γ(v) is a compact semianalytic set, therefore, it has finitely many connected components. At least one of those components is such that, for every Poisson game Γ(v) sufficiently close to Γ(v), there is a Nash equilibrium of Γ(v) close to it.
Proof. Lemma 1 implies that the set of Nash equilibria is a semianalytic set.
Hence, it is made of finitely many connected components.
For the second part, we prove a stronger result. Recall that the set of fixed 
set of Nash equilibria that is robust against every perturbation in P(v).
From an applied standpoint, a connected component of equilibria (or a stable set contained in it) does not substantially differ from a single-valued equilibrium concept as long as every Nash equilibrium in such a component induces the same probability distribution over outcomes. This is the case in generic finite normal form games (Harsanyi, 1973) and in generic finite extensive form games (Kreps and Wilson, 1982) . Govindan and Wilson (2001) show that these results can be 6 Alternative definitions of stability have been proposed (Hillas, 1990; Mertens, 1989 Mertens, , 1991 such that every solution is connected. 7 Games in P(v) cannot be generated by strategy perturbations in the game Γ(v). The definition of the appropriate set of perturbations is given in the Appendix.
easily derived from some basic properties of semialgebraic sets and functions.
Such properties are shared by some o-minimal structures.
O-MINIMAL STRUCTURES ON R
The objective of this section is to provide the necessary background to show that the graph of the Nash equilibrium correspondence and the set of Nash equilibria of any Poisson game belong to a family of sets with very convenient finiteness properties. In this section we follow van den Dries (1986 Dries ( , 1998 and Blume and Zame (1992) . We simply present the relevant results without their proofs and, where appropriate, we indicate some of their consequences for Poisson games.
Before identifying the family of sets that we are interested in, we need an intermediate step.
there is an open neighborhood U, a strictly positive integer l, and a bounded semianalytic set
It is easy to see that every semianalytic set is subanalytic. Like the collection of semialgebraic sets, the collection of subanalytic sets is closed under finite unions, finite intersections, finite products, and complementation (Gabriélov, 1968) (2) If X ∈ S m then R × X ∈ S m+1 and X × R ∈ S m+1 .
(3) For each m we have {(x 1 , . . . , x m ) :
(4) If X ∈ S m+1 and π : R m+1 → R m is the projection onto the first m coordi-
(5) The ordering of the real line {(x 1 , x 2 ) : x 1 < x 2 } belongs to S 2 .
(6) The sets in S 1 are exactly the finite unions of points and intervals.
Examples of o-minimal structures are the collection of semialgebraic sets, the collection of semilinear sets, and the collection of finitely semianalytic sets. Following standard terminology, once we fix an o-minimal structure S = {S m } m∈N + , we say that X is a definable set if X ∈ S m for some m. We say that a function or correspondence is definable if its graph is a definable set.
To later prove that the graph of the Nash equilibrium correspondence in Pois- We already established that the set of Nash equilibria of any Poisson game has finitely many connected components. Lemma 4 below shows that, if the outcome set Ω is finite, the graph of the Nash equilibrium correspondence in Poisson games graph(NE) is a globaly subanalytic set. We can apply the second part of Theorem 2 to the projection π : graph(NE) → R #ΩT to the space of games to conclude that there is a global bound N * on the number of connected components of equilibria that any Poisson game can have.
Similarly to the family of semialgebraic sets, the family of globaly subanalytic sets also contains the graphs of addition and multiplication:
8 Intuitively, this expression can be replaced by another one involving definable sets and the set theoretic operations allowed by Axioms 1 to 4. We have that ∧ corresponds to the intersection of sets, ∨ to the union of sets, and ¬ to the complement of a set. Additionally, we can replace the universal and existential quantifiers by suitable projections.
(7) {(x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ) : x 3 = x 1 + x 2 } ∈ S 3 , and
O-minimal structures satisfying (7) and (8) If X is a definable set it follows that we can unambiguously define dim(X ), the dimension of X , to be the largest dimension of any such simplex.
Theorem 4 (Generic Triviality). Let S satisfy (7) and (8) and let f : X → Y be a continuous definable function. There is a lower-dimensional definable set Z ⊂ Y such that for each of the finitely many connected components C of Y \ Z there is a definable set F and a definable homeomorphism h
The next two lemmas are used in Section 5 to prove generic determinacy results of Nash equilibria in Poisson games. They follow immediately from the Generic Triviality Theorem. See Govindan and McLennan (2001) for the proof of the following result in the context of semialgebraic geometry.
Lemma 2. Let S also satisfy (7) and (8) and let f : X → Y be a continuous definable function. Then
We say that a definable set is generic if its complement is a closed and lowerdimensional definable set. Furthermore, we say that a point satisfying some property is generic if it resides in a generic definable set where every point satisfies such a property. See Govindan and Wilson (2001) for the semialgebraic version of the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Let S also satisfy (7) and (8) 
GENERIC DETERMINACY OF EQUILIBRIA IN POISSON GAMES
To only consider finite-dimensional spaces we assume that the set of outcomes Ω is finite. This assumption is satisfied in most applications of Poisson games.
Assumption 1. The set of outcomes Ω is finite.
We have already seen that given a Poisson game Γ(v) the Nash equilibrium conditions define a semianalytic set. Since the set of Nash equilibria is bounded, they also define a globaly subanalytic set. We now show that the Nash equilibrium correspondence is also globaly subanalytic.
Lemma 4. The Nash equilibrium correspondence NE :
Proof. By definition, we have to show that the graph of NE is a globaly subanalytic set. Denote by E the set of (ς, v) ∈ R s ×(0, 1) #ΩT that satisfy Conditions (3.1), (3.2), and (3.3). That is, E is the graph of the Nash equilibrium correspondence restricted to the domain where every utility value lies in the bounded interval (0, 1). The set E is a bounded semianalytic set, therefore, globaly subanalytic.
The Nash equilibrium conditions are not altered under an affine transformation of the utility functions v t : Ω → R. Therefore, the graph of the Nash equilibrium correspondence satisfies
Since the family of globaly subanalytic sets is closed under definability, the correspondence NE : R #ΩT → Σ is globaly subanalytic.
We now derive a result analogous to the generic finiteness of equilibria in normal form games (Harsanyi, 1973) and of equilibrium outcomes in finite extensive form games (Kreps and Wilson, 1982) . Given τ ∈τ(Σ) and an action c ∈ C t we can compute a probability distribution p t (· | c, τ) on Ω where, for every ω ∈ Ω,
Hence, we can write a type t player's expected utility if she chooses action c while the rest of the population plays according to τ as U t (c, τ; 
Definition 6. We say that τ ∈τ(Σ) is a maximal dimension point if for every t ∈ T the rank of the matrix whose columns are the vectors (
The argument below does not substantially differ from the one used by Govindan and McLennan (2001) and illustrates how many semialgebraic proofs in finite games can be readily extended to Poisson games. We say that τ is a Nash equilibrium behavior if there is a Nash equilibrium σ ∈ Σ such that τ =τ(σ).
Proposition 2. If every Nash equilibrium behaviour τ ∈τ(Σ) is a maximal dimension point then, for generic utilities, the set of Nash equilibria is finite.
Proof. It is enough to focus on Nash equilibria where every action of every type of player is used with positive probability. Write CNE for the correspondence that assigns to each utility vector the set of completely mixed Nash equilibria.
For every t ∈ T take some action d ∈ C t . Let σ ∈ CNE(v) and τ =τ(σ). The set
has dimension #Ω − (#C t − 1) because τ is a maximal dimension point.
Consider the projection π : graph(CNE) → Σ. The previous argument implies
We obtain the desired result applying Lemma 3 to the projection from graph(CNE) to the space of utilities R #ΩT .
The next assumption implies that every τ ∈τ(Σ) is a maximal dimension point.
It says that, for each type t and each action c ∈ C t , from the viewpoint of a player of type t, there is an outcome ω t,c that can be induced with positive probability only if she plays c t .
Assumption 2. For every type t and every action c ∈ C t there is an outcome
In a voting model, for instance, this assumption is satisfied if voters care not only about the outcome of the election but also about the ballot they cast. That is, if for every player the situation where candidate A wins and she voted for A is different from the situation where candidate A wins and she voted for B. The reason we discuss Assumption 2 is only to notice that, under such assumption, the simple semialgebraic proof given by Govindan and Wilson (2001) to show the generic finiteness of Nash equilibria in normal form games applies almost verbatim to Poisson games. In fact, using such a proof, we can also conclude that the graph of CNE is a real analytic manifold of dimension #ΩT.
It makes sense to impose more structure on the outcome function θ so that outcomes are not defined from the viewpoint of a player of a particular type but have a universal description. This is the case in political economy models where the outcome of the game simply corresponds to the winner of the election.
Thus, let us consider a family of Poisson voting games. Let Ω = {ω 1 , . . . , ω K } be the finite set of candidates. Every type t has the same set of ballots (actions) C available. A ballot c ∈ C is a K-dimensional vector that specifies for each candidate the number of votes c i given to each candidate ω i . An electoral system specifies the set of permissible ballots C. For instance, under plurality rule, such a set is the collection of (c 1 , . . . , c K ) such that c i ∈ {0, 1} for every i and K i=1 c i ∈ {0, 1}. Under negative plurality, C is the collection of (c 1 , . . . , c K ) such that c i ∈ {0, 1} for every i and
Under approval voting, C is simply the set of all (c 1 , . . . , c K ) such that c i ∈ {0, 1} for every i. Thus, aggregating the ballots cast by the players, we can consider the set of ballot (action) profiles to be N K + . The outcome function θ : N K + → ∆(Ω) selects for each ballot profile the candidate that has received the most votes. Ties are broken using the uniform probability distribution over the winning candidates. A type t player has preferences over candidates represented by the utility function v t ∈ R Ω . Thus, a type t player who casts ballot c when the ballot profile is x obtains utility
De Sinopoli (2001) shows that in generic normal form plurality voting games, the set of Nash equilibria such that more than one candidate wins with positive probability is finite. In turn, De Sinopoli, Iannantuoni, and Pimienta (2015) show that (1) in generic normal form negative plurality voting games the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes is finite, and (2) Consider the square matrix
Letting ∅ represent abstention, we construct a new matrix subtracting from each row the row vector (p t (ω 1 | ∅,τ),... , p t (ω L | ∅,τ)). For each two candidates
. We obtain:
The expression π t (ω | ω ′ , τ) represents the increase, as perceived by a player of type t, in the probability that candidate ω wins the election if she votes for candidate ω ′ compared to the situation where she abstains. Hence,
Furthermore, for every row r, we have
(1) the increase in the probability that candidate ω r wins has to be equal to the decrease in the probability that the winner of the election is in Ω \ {ω r }, and (2) L < K. Thus, M ′ t is a strictly diagonally dominant matrix which implies that it has full rank. The same is true for every principal submatrix of M ′ t . It follows that M ′ t is an M-matrix (Ostrowski, 1955, p. 95) since it is a square matrix such that all diagonal elements are strictly positive, all nondiagonal elements weakly (actually, strictly) negative, and all principal minors of all orders strictly positive. Ostrowski (1955, p. 97) shows that if we add the same non-negative row vector to each row of an Mmatrix then the determinant of the resulting matrix is strictly positive. Thus, the matrix M t has full rank, τ is a maximal dimension point, and Proposition 2 implies the desired result.
Part (2) can be handled in a similar way, therefore, we skip this part.
For part (3), let τ be a Nash equilibrium behavior. Let Ω = {a, b, c} and let type t players have preferences a ≻ b ≻ c. It is easy to see that action c (approving only candidate c) and abstaining are both strictly dominated, so we can consider the reduced game where a type t player has only action a (approving candidate a) and action ab (approving both candidate a and b) available. Consider the matrix
The second row minus the first row represents the change in probability resulting from the additional approval vote for candidate b. This additional approval vote for b strictly decreases the probability of winning of candidates a and c and strictly increases the probability of winning of candidate b. Hence, the second row cannot be a multiple of the first row and, therefore, the rank of M t is two.
We conclude that every Nash equilibrium behavior τ is a maximal dimension point. Proposition 2 implies the desired result. 
Finally, given a subset A ⊂τ(Σ) and a point τ ∈τ(Σ), the distance between τ and
We are ready to define stable sets in Poisson games. We define a perturbation U t (c, τ)dµ • .
Definition 7.
A set of equilibria of a Poisson game Γ is stable if it is minimal with respect to the following property:
Property (S). S ⊂ Σ is a closed set of Nash equilibria of Γ satisfying: for any ε > 0 there is aη > 0 such that for any perturbation (η, µ • ) with 0 < η <η we can find a σ that is ε-close to S and satisfies σ ∈ BR((1 − η)δ(σ) + ηµ • ). represents the corresponding utility if she chooses action b. The game has two stable sets, {σ * } and the disconnected set {(a), (b)}. The Nash equilibrium strategy a is robust against any perturbation that "lifts" the function U(a, τ) more than U (b, τ) while the Nash equilibrium strategy b is robust against any perturbation that "lifts" the function U(b, τ) more than U(a, τ). Note that these two strategies belong to different components of the set of Nash equilibria of the game.
Of course, this game has the connected stable set {σ * }. We can now easily show that any Poisson game has at least one such component.
Proposition 1. Every Poisson game Γ(v) has a stable set contained in a connected component of equilibria. Moreover, every Poisson game has a minimal connected set of Nash equilibria that satisfies Property (S).
Proof. Stable sets in Poisson games are an example of Q-robust sets of fixed points (McLennan, 2012, Definition 8.3.5) . In broad terms, a set of fixed points X of a correspondence F is Q-robust if every correspondence close to F that can be obtained through a perturbation in some class Q has a fixed point close to X .
The proof of Theorem 1 shows that every Poisson game has a connected set of Nash equilibria that is essential and, therefore, Q-robust. Moreover, McLennan (2012, Theorem 8.3.8) shows that, if F is an upper semi-countinuous and convex valued correspondence, every Q-robust set contains a minimal Q-robust set and that every connected Q-robust set contains a minimal connected Q-robust set.
The desired result follows.
